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Pilots of aircraft engaged in formation join-ups are expected to continue operating the transponder until established in formation. Once established in formation, all except the lead aircraft should be instructed to ‘squawk standby’.
Pilots of non-powered aircraft are also encouraged to operate the transponder during flight outside airspace where carriage and operation of SSR transponder is mandatory.
If a pilot has selected Mode A Code 7500 and has been requested to confirm this code by ATC, the pilot should, according to circumstances, either confirm this or not reply at all. If the pilot does not reply, ATC should take this as confirmation that the use of Code 7500 is not an inadvertent false code selection.
When requested by ATC to confirm the code selected, the pilot should:
Mise en œuvre
En l’absence d’instructions de l’ATS, le pilote sélectionne :
ERRONEOUS LEVEL INFORMATION IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICE PROVISION
ERRONEOUS LEVEL INFORMATION IN FLIGHT INFORMATION SERVICE PROVISION
The procedures for the verification of pressure-altitude-derived displayed information in the provision of flight information service should be established by the competent authority taking into consideration GM1 ATS.TR.155(f) in EASA ED Decision 2020/008/R.
[applicable until 30 April 2025 – Regulation (EU) 2016/1185]
[applicable from 1 May 2025 – Regulation (EU) 2024/404]
AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION SETTING
[applicable from 1 May 2025 – ED Decision 2024/007/R]
OPERATION OF ADS-B TRANSMITTERS
To indicate that it is in a state of emergency or to transmit other urgent information, an aircraft equipped with ADS-B may operate either of the emergency and/or urgency mode as follows:
[applicable from 1 May 2025 – ED Decision 2024/007/R]
OPERATION OF ADS-B TRANSMITTERS
Some aircraft equipped with first-generation ADS-B avionics do not have the capability described in GM1 SERA.13015 and only have the capability to transmit a general emergency alert regardless of the code selected by the pilot.
[applicable from 1 May 2025 – ED Decision 2024/007/R]
AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION SETTING
Point (b)(1) of AMC1 SERA.13015 requires aircraft operators to incorporate into an operations manual a mechanism that ensures the uniqueness of aircraft call signs. For example, they may elect to assign each pilot-in-command or each airframe with a unique number, which may also be augmented with the addition of letters. The call sign, consisting of the operator designator issued by ICAO and the unique number together with any augmenting letter, is to be inserted into the Mode S identification feature prior to departure and used in all radio communications unless instructed otherwise by air traffic services.
[applicable from 1 May 2025 – ED Decision 2024/007/R]
DUPLICATED AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION
To demonstrate the resilience of the ATS surveillance system to duplicated aircraft identification, as prescribed in point (b)(2) of AMC1 SERA.13015, it is normally enough to indicate that a duplicated downlinked aircraft identification would not affect, or reduce in any way, the performance of the surveillance tracker for generating and validating system tracks. In the case of a multisensor tracking system, using surveillance information from sensors belonging to neighbouring air traffic services providers, indication that the neighbouring surveillance tracker is not affected by potential duplication of the aircraft identification is needed.
[applicable from 1 May 2025 – ED Decision 2024/007/R]
AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION SETTING
The ATS surveillance information used by an air navigation service provider is in many Member States also used by other authorities (e.g. air defence, search and rescue). The impact, if any, of allowing aircraft operating without a flight plan to transmit aircraft identification other than aircraft registration should be assessed and documented accordingly, as prescribed in point (b)(3) of AMC1 SERA.13015.
[applicable from 1 May 2025 – ED Decision 2024/007/R]
TRANSPONDER FAILURE AFTER DEPARTURE
When an aircraft experiencing transponder failure after departure is operating or expected to operate in an area where the carriage of a functioning transponder with specified capabilities is mandatory, the ATC units concerned should endeavour to provide for continuation of the flight to the aerodrome of first intended landing in accordance with the flight plan. However, in certain traffic situations, either in terminal areas or en-route, continuation of the flight may not be possible, particularly when failure is detected shortly after take-off. The aircraft may then be required to return to the departure aerodrome or to land at the nearest suitable aerodrome acceptable to the operator concerned and to ATC.
TRANSPONDER FAILURE BEFORE DEPARTURE
In case of a transponder failure which is detected before departure from an aerodrome where it is not practicable to effect a repair, the aircraft concerned should be permitted to proceed, as directly as possible, to the nearest suitable aerodrome where repair can be made. When granting clearance to such aircraft, ATC should take into consideration the existing or anticipated traffic situation and may have to modify the time of departure, flight level or route of the intended flight. Subsequent adjustments may become necessary during the course of the flight. Note that Article 4(4) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1207/201118 also addresses this issue.